원본 편지 링크: https://m.dcinside.com/board/kpd/2782
Dear comrade,
Thank you for your email. You ask for data “on Russian capital export in neo-colonial countries and especially in Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine before and after Russian occupation.” We refer you to the section, “Examining Russian Foreign Investments,” of our article, “Imperialist Rivalries Escalate Russia: Capital Export & Global Power,” in 1917 No.41. In particular, we would highlight the following paragraphs:
‘Curiously, “Cyprus” is the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, with just under $14 billion FDI stock, as of January 2015. Nominally, Russia, with $2.7 billion FDI stock, is only the fourth-largest source of FDI in Ukraine, behind Cyprus, Germany and the Netherlands. However, accounting for trans-shipment, the OECD estimated the real level of Russian investments to be about $9.9 billion. Part of the figure included investments from “Dutch” company VEON.
‘The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) has created its own database (taking trans-shipment and round-tripping into account) to better estimate real foreign investments by and in Eurasian countries (“Monitoring of direct investments of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in Eurasia,” EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2014), and its findings demonstrate that standard FDI measures can both exaggerate and minimize the real situation. For instance, in 2016, the EDB database shows the real Russian FDI stock in Cyprus to be negligible ($50 million) compared to the $150 billion reported using conventional means. The real figure for Russian FDI stock in the Netherlands was only $1.1 billion compared to the nominal $60 billion (“EAEU and Eurasia: Monitoring and Analysis of Direct Investments 2017,” EDB Centre for Integration Students, 2017). Conversely, standard accounts put Russian FDI in Pakistan and Bangladesh at zero, whereas the EDB database reveal $1.2 billion and $1.1 billion in FDI stock, respectively. Other large discrepancies reported for countries with supposedly miniscule Russian investments are Iraq ($4.3 billion in real investments, mostly by Lukoil), Egypt ($3.3 billion), Poland ($1.1 billion) and Romania ($1.6 billion).
‘In 2016, Russia’s total real outward FDI stock in Eurasia (excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia) was $85.7 billion. While Italy, Germany and Britain hosted about 40 percent of that amount, most of the rest was invested in neocolonies like Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Serbia, Turkey, India, Vietnam and Mongolia. That same year, Russia had an additional $34.8 billion in FDI stock in Georgia and the CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) (“Monitoring of Mutual Investments in CIS Countries 2017,” EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2017). Based on these figures, Russia has something on the order of $75 billion invested in neocolonies in Europe and Asia alone.
‘This demonstrates that, while Russian investment in imperialist countries is comparatively small, in neocolonies it can be hugely significant. Not only are Russian capitalists making profits from weaker countries, but it is often on a scale that can give Russia considerable leverage over those countries. Liuhto notes: “Compared to the EU, the USA and China, the importance of the Russian OFDI in some CIS countries is gargantuan. Russia covers, for instance, the bulk of the Tajik inward FDI stock and some 40-60 % of the Belarusian and Uzbek inward FDI stock” (“Motivations of Russian firms to invest abroad,” 2015). The Eurasian Development Bank’s database indicates that Russian investments also account for 50-75 percent of inward FDI stock in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia, 30-50 percent in Iraq and North Korea and other significant proportions in Pakistan and Ukraine. Russia invests approximately $1 billion annually in Kazakhstan, where about one-third of foreign companies are Russian (The Astana Times, 11 September 2017).’
We do not have precise data comparing current and past Russian investments in the individual countries you cite, but there are aggregate figures for Russian foreign direct investment that show a substantial increase since the early 2000s. The section of the above article entitled, “Capital Export: Overview of Foreign Investment,” provides these data and presents them in Graphs 1-3. While Russian investments in “neo-colonial countries and especially in Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine” pre-date Russia’s emergence as an imperialist power, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence that those investments increased significantly. It is also worth noting that Russia’s investments have also increased in neo-colonies outside of its “near abroad,” e.g., the Middle East, Latin America.
Regarding China, you pose some interesting theoretical problems, which you summarize with your question: Is China a “deformed worker’s state in which internal bourgeois element ascended to imperialist stage”? We share your view that such a development is still in the “realm of conjecture,” and of course we agree with your approach of considering such questions without denying the fundamental nature of China as a deformed workers' state.
You also raise some questions about situations where bourgeois states are under the control of a deformed or degenerated workers’ state: Hong Kong, the Baltic states before the 1940s and a hypothetical Chinese takeover of Mongolia. History shows that there is no fixed rule that territory under control of a workers’ state is automatically part of that state or a separate deformed workers’ state, although it is clearly an unstable and contradictory situation. It depends on a number of factors, such as the current objectives of the DWS, the strength of the DWS and the international context.
Unfortunately, we now do not have any supporters in South Korea, though we are of course interested in talking to Korean Trotskyists and building our organization.
If you are interested in discussing any of these subjects more, or any of the other materials on our website, please let us know.
comradely
OOOO
for the IBT
Dear comrade,
Thank you for your email. You ask for data “on Russian capital export in neo-colonial countries and especially in Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine before and after Russian occupation.” We refer you to the section, “Examining Russian Foreign Investments,” of our article, “Imperialist Rivalries Escalate Russia: Capital Export & Global Power,” in 1917 No.41. In particular, we would highlight the following paragraphs:
‘Curiously, “Cyprus” is the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, with just under $14 billion FDI stock, as of January 2015. Nominally, Russia, with $2.7 billion FDI stock, is only the fourth-largest source of FDI in Ukraine, behind Cyprus, Germany and the Netherlands. However, accounting for trans-shipment, the OECD estimated the real level of Russian investments to be about $9.9 billion. Part of the figure included investments from “Dutch” company VEON.
‘The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) has created its own database (taking trans-shipment and round-tripping into account) to better estimate real foreign investments by and in Eurasian countries (“Monitoring of direct investments of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in Eurasia,” EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2014), and its findings demonstrate that standard FDI measures can both exaggerate and minimize the real situation. For instance, in 2016, the EDB database shows the real Russian FDI stock in Cyprus to be negligible ($50 million) compared to the $150 billion reported using conventional means. The real figure for Russian FDI stock in the Netherlands was only $1.1 billion compared to the nominal $60 billion (“EAEU and Eurasia: Monitoring and Analysis of Direct Investments 2017,” EDB Centre for Integration Students, 2017). Conversely, standard accounts put Russian FDI in Pakistan and Bangladesh at zero, whereas the EDB database reveal $1.2 billion and $1.1 billion in FDI stock, respectively. Other large discrepancies reported for countries with supposedly miniscule Russian investments are Iraq ($4.3 billion in real investments, mostly by Lukoil), Egypt ($3.3 billion), Poland ($1.1 billion) and Romania ($1.6 billion).
‘In 2016, Russia’s total real outward FDI stock in Eurasia (excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia) was $85.7 billion. While Italy, Germany and Britain hosted about 40 percent of that amount, most of the rest was invested in neocolonies like Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Serbia, Turkey, India, Vietnam and Mongolia. That same year, Russia had an additional $34.8 billion in FDI stock in Georgia and the CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) (“Monitoring of Mutual Investments in CIS Countries 2017,” EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2017). Based on these figures, Russia has something on the order of $75 billion invested in neocolonies in Europe and Asia alone.
‘This demonstrates that, while Russian investment in imperialist countries is comparatively small, in neocolonies it can be hugely significant. Not only are Russian capitalists making profits from weaker countries, but it is often on a scale that can give Russia considerable leverage over those countries. Liuhto notes: “Compared to the EU, the USA and China, the importance of the Russian OFDI in some CIS countries is gargantuan. Russia covers, for instance, the bulk of the Tajik inward FDI stock and some 40-60 % of the Belarusian and Uzbek inward FDI stock” (“Motivations of Russian firms to invest abroad,” 2015). The Eurasian Development Bank’s database indicates that Russian investments also account for 50-75 percent of inward FDI stock in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia, 30-50 percent in Iraq and North Korea and other significant proportions in Pakistan and Ukraine. Russia invests approximately $1 billion annually in Kazakhstan, where about one-third of foreign companies are Russian (The Astana Times, 11 September 2017).’
We do not have precise data comparing current and past Russian investments in the individual countries you cite, but there are aggregate figures for Russian foreign direct investment that show a substantial increase since the early 2000s. The section of the above article entitled, “Capital Export: Overview of Foreign Investment,” provides these data and presents them in Graphs 1-3. While Russian investments in “neo-colonial countries and especially in Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine” pre-date Russia’s emergence as an imperialist power, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence that those investments increased significantly. It is also worth noting that Russia’s investments have also increased in neo-colonies outside of its “near abroad,” e.g., the Middle East, Latin America.
Regarding China, you pose some interesting theoretical problems, which you summarize with your question: Is China a “deformed worker’s state in which internal bourgeois element ascended to imperialist stage”? We share your view that such a development is still in the “realm of conjecture,” and of course we agree with your approach of considering such questions without denying the fundamental nature of China as a deformed workers' state.
You also raise some questions about situations where bourgeois states are under the control of a deformed or degenerated workers’ state: Hong Kong, the Baltic states before the 1940s and a hypothetical Chinese takeover of Mongolia. History shows that there is no fixed rule that territory under control of a workers’ state is automatically part of that state or a separate deformed workers’ state, although it is clearly an unstable and contradictory situation. It depends on a number of factors, such as the current objectives of the DWS, the strength of the DWS and the international context.
Unfortunately, we now do not have any supporters in South Korea, though we are of course interested in talking to Korean Trotskyists and building our organization.
If you are interested in discussing any of these subjects more, or any of the other materials on our website, please let us know.
comradely
OOOO
for the IBT
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