Thank you, Chairman Klein, for your kind invitation and introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, I am very much pleased to be here with you. Today I have come here with my cane because I am injured in my hip joints due to military government assassination, but I have never used this cane and will never use it for the purpose of caning anybody else. Thank you.

   I will now share my ideas on the three problems confronting the United States today in Asia: they are the North Korean nuclear problem, desirable relations between the US and East Asian nations, and those between the US and Korea. It is possible to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem that has been confounding us and testing our patience. I am convinced of this because North Korea's goal in this adventure is not to develop nuclear weapons but to realize its number one foreign policy ive: normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States.

   Kim Il-sung desperately hopes, through diplomatic relations and economic cooperation with the West, to escape from the hopeless economic situation and the extreme international isolation so that he can pass a stable regime on to his son. Needless to say, it is impossible for the North to improve its relations with the West unless it gives up the development of nuclear weapons. These two ives are mutually incompatible.

   Until 1953, Kim Il-sung attempted to unify the Korean peninsula using military force. After that attempt failed, he tried repeatedly to instigate a communist revolution from within South Korea. But following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of communist governments in Eastern Europe, Pyongyang began to experience international isolation and rapid deterioration of its economy.

   As a result, the North made a series of policy shifts. In 1991, North Korea made three major concessions to the West. The first was the joint entry, together with South Korea, into the United Nations, which North Korea had opposed for more than three decades. The second was the acceptance of cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the world community, especially the US, Japan, Russia, and China, which South Korea and the West had advocated since 1973. The third was mutual recognition of the South and North Korean governments as legitimate entities by signing a North-South agreement in December 1991.

   Though this series of concessions advocated by Kim Il-sung expected a quid pro quo in the form of diplomatic and economic cooperation from the West, such expectations have not been fulfilled. Consequently, the hardliners gained the upper hand, resulting in North Korea’s declaration of its intention to pull out of the NPT, accompanied by a series of belligerent statements. The hardliners thought, “If we are given no way out but to ruin, we must—we might as well go down fighting to the end.”

   North Korea doesn't have the military capability to win a full-scale war, but has enough power to inflict casualties on millions of South Koreans and Americans. When North Korea announced its decision to abrogate the NPT on March 12 last year, I was at Cambridge University as a visiting fellow. Upon hearing the news, I immediately proposed a two-pronged approach to this program: a package deal of simultaneous give-and-take together with cooperation from China.

   North Korea must give up its nuclear ambitions and guarantee South Korea's security; at the same time, the United States must proceed with diplomatic normalization leading to economic cooperation and North Korean security assurance, including the cancellation of the annual Team Spirit exercise. However, it is important for the United States to consult with China and seek its cooperation on North Korea’s nuclear program. China would no doubt cooperate in this matter, because the nuclear issue is not only Korea's and the United States’ problem, but also China's problem.

   And because China too does not want North Korea to possess nuclear weapons, this is a foolproof approach. If North Korea accepts this package deal, so much the better; if, on the other hand, Kim Il-sung rejects this package, China will have no choice but to support economic sanctions, unless of course it is willing to endure international criticism and loss of face. This is nothing for us to lose with this one-shot peace deal—we do not need to waste time any longer. I am not saying we should trust North Korea, but simply test its real intention.

   Asian face-saving is even more important in dealing with North Korea, a country ruled for five decades by one man with absolute authority. Kim Il-sung's face cannot be compromised, no matter what might be offered. We must make good use of this point in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem.

   President Clinton has recently made a significant diplomatic gesture by sending the Reverend Billy Graham to Pyongyang with his own message to Kim Il-sung, by receiving an honorary message from the leader of the most powerful nation in the world. Kim Il-sung’s stature has been greatly enhanced not long after North Korea accepted IAEA inspections to a considerable degree. I believe that Reverend Graham’s Pyongyang visit played a considerable role in North Korea's change of attitude, and I heard today that there is a good development regarding nuclear inspections between North Korea and the IAEA, with the effort of the American government.

   I do not have the right to meddle in the international affairs of the United States; however, since US actions in Asia will profoundly affect us, and as a friend of America, I am compelled to ask you to respect face-saving as an Asian way, while insisting on human rights progress and improvement in trade practices. This is how to ensure success in the long run.

   We feel very strongly about the tactics America has used in opposing Beijing’s bid for the Olympics, pressing China on MFN, and advancing its trade interests with Japan, South Korea, and other Asian countries. Asian nations’ face-saving is even more important in dealing with North Korea, a country ruled for five decades by one man with absolute authority. Kim Il-sung's face cannot be compromised, no matter what might be offered. We must make good use of this point in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem.

   President Clinton has recently made a significant diplomatic gesture by sending the Reverend Billy Graham to Pyongyang with his own message to Kim Il-sung, receiving an honorary message from the leader of the most powerful nation in the world. Kim Il-sung’s stature was greatly enhanced not long after North Korea accepted IAEA inspections to a considerable degree. I believe that Reverend Graham’s Pyongyang visit played a considerable role in North Korea's change of attitude, and I heard today that there is a good development regarding nuclear inspections between North Korea and the IAEA with the effort of the American government.

   I propose to President Clinton that he send an emissary to China and North Korea with statements respected internationally, trusted by the Chinese and North Koreans, and sharing the views of President Clinton. Mr. Clinton's emissary can play an important role there. In recent interviews with the American press community, he showed a gesture of consideration and willingness to make concessions; he even expressed his wish to visit the United States. I urge Washington not to miss this opportunity. Kim Il-sung's visit here by itself will signal the end of the 50-year-old warlike situation on the Korean peninsula.

   The American visit may take the form of an address to the UN General Assem.bly as a leader of a member nation; the National Press Club invitation may also be suited to Kim's visit. I must stress that the US should consult closely with the South Korean government before sending the emissary to the North, lest North Korea believe it can divide the US and South Korea. Furthermore, the emissary’s mission may fail without South Korean cooperation.

   Last but not least is the US-Korean relationship. There are several points to be made about this. First, the US must keep its troops in Korea. US forces are needed not only to prevent the North from attacking the South, but also to maintain the balance of power in the region.

   Second, the US should exercise leadership in creating a ‘2+4’ Northeast Asia cooperative security system. These six countries are North and South Korea, plus the US, China, Russia, and Japan. This Northeast Asian security system may resemble a scaled-down version of NATO, but I am not proposing that this multilateral system replace the existing security arrangement between the US and Korea.

   Third, Korea is the eighth-largest trading partner of the US, and I hope the two countries remain good economic partners for mutual long-term benefit. I might add that trade conflicts between our two nations should be resolved harmoniously and with patience, instead of excessive unilateral pressure. Some in the US have raised fears of war and created excessive tension regarding the present nuclear problem. Koreans are worried about such attitudes. US and South Korean authorities must maintain composure and solve the problems patiently and peacefully.

   Ladies and gentlemen, I have been concerned about the US’s relations with North Korea and East Asian nations. I hope my brief remarks here today will help shed new light on desirable American approaches toward Asia and promote better understanding and cooperation between our two countries. Thank you for listening to my speech.