ICISS는 유엔의 권능과 신뢰의 추락을 우려하기는 하지만, 안보리의 승인이 없을 때에는 총회의 결의에 의한 개입을, 이도 여의치 않은 때는 지역기구나 개별 국가의 독자적인 인도적 개입을 인정하고 있다(ICISS, 2001a: 55).

- 국제․지역연구 18권 4호 '보호책임의 국제정치: 인권, 국가주권, 유엔과 미국패권', 중앙대 정치외교학과 부교수 이혜정



6.36 Interventions by ad hoc coalitions (or, even more, individual states) acting without the approval of the Security Council, or the General Assembly, or a regional or sub-regional grouping of which the target state is a member, do not – it would be an understatement to say – find wide favour. Even those countries involved in the Kosovo intervention, and prepared to passionately defend its legitimacy by reference to all the threshold and precautionary criteria we have identified in this report, for the most part acknowledge its highly exceptional character, and express the view that it would have been much preferable to have secured the Security Council’s – or failing that the General Assembly’s – endorsement. One view that has some currency is that an ex post facto authorization, of the kind that has occurred for the African regional instances entioned above, might conceivably have been obtained in the Kosovo and Rwanda cases, and may offer a way out of the dilemma should any such case occur again in the future.

6.37 As a matter of political reality, it would be impossible to find consensus, in the Commission’s view, around any set of proposals for military intervention which acknowledged the validity of any intervention not authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly. But that may still leave circumstances when the Security Council fails to discharge what this Commission would regard as its responsibility to protect, in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for action. It is a real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.

6.38 In the view of the Commission, there are two important messages for the Security Council in all of this.

6.39 The first message is that if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, then it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of these situations. If collective organizations will not authorize collective inter-vention against regimes that flout the most elementary norms of legitimate governmental behaviour, then the pressures for intervention by ad hoc coalitions or individual states will surely intensify. And there is a risk then that such interventions, without the discipline and constraints of UN authorization, will not be conducted for the right reasons or with the right commitment to the necessary precautionary principles.

6.40 The second message is that if, following the failure of the Council to act, a military intervention is undertaken by an ad hoccoalition or individual state which does fully observe and respect all the criteria we have identified, and if that intervention is carried through successfully – and is seen by world public opinion to have been carried through successfully – then this may have enduringly serious consequences for the stature and credibility of the UN itself.



대충 정리하면,

ICISS는 보호책임의 주체를 유엔 안보리만으로 국한하지 않으며 나토 등의 지역기구나 개별 국가의 개입을 그로인한 문제에도 불구하고 인정하고 있음. 왜냐면 개입의 실행 과정에서 발생할 현실적 난제를 극복하기 위해서임.

또한 ICISS 보고서 중 6.36서 나토의 보스니아 내전 개입에 대해 사후승인을 인정하고 있고. 하지만 그로인해 발생할 문제 역시 충분히 서술되어 있음을 주지해야 함.

혹자는 왜 서방이 크림반도의 독립 시도와 러시아의 개입은 인정치 않으면서 보스니아 문제에 대해서는 독립을 인정했느냐 따지는데 이는 독립을 요구할 국제법적 여건들, 그리고 개입에 필요한 단서 조건들을 살펴봐야지 단순 비교는 부적절함.

이따 시간 나면 크림반도 관련 국제법 어쩌고 글을 다른 곳에 누가 쓴 게 있던데 그거라도 퍼오겠음.



그리고 쓸데없는 얘기 하나 더 적으면 이 보호책임이 이라크 침공 논리에 악용되면서 인도적 개입론자들은 졸지에 이에 대한 변명까지 해야 됐다고...

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