http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q4/354


http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d313


Kissinger: Good, I’m delighted.

I will be very open with you on our general approach. As our President said to your President, and as I explained last time, we are sympathetic to your program. A strong France, no matter how difficult it may be sometimes, is in our interest—a strong France that is interested in its own defense—and we are particularly disquieted by trends in other countries to neutralism. And if the French program fails, and if France were driven to a sense of impotence, it would be to the disadvantage of all of us. This is in the context of overall agreement between us on political issues and a generally favorable relationship between our two countries.

Let me give you our general assessment. As we work together, we will have to refine our joint strategic assessment. Because we can’t be very helpful on projects unless we know what you’re trying to do.

Our assessment is that the Soviet offensive capability is growing rapidly. When the Soviets have deployed accurate MIRVs, in the late ’70s and early ’80s, the vulnerability of all land-based forces will increase, especially without warning. So one of our preliminary assessments is, if one looks at your problem as a system, we think—subject to your comments—that finding some method of warning will become of some consequence. Mr. Foster will have some observations on that.

Galley: [6 lines not declassified]





Kissinger: And fruitless! [Laughter] My problem with Jobert is something else. He wants to show that he extorted from me what I already offered. [Laughter]

Our assessment is: 38 SS–11s could remove your land-based forces, with a 95% probability—unless you obtain tactical warning, and a certain amount of intelligence information as to targets, will also be useful.




Galley: It’s a major problem for everybody. Let me give you my approach. The subject is the fabrication of warheads; it is out of the question that more than two or three French will be in contact with your people, if we want to keep security in each category. In warheads, only two people...

Kissinger: And in some cases we may not be able to give you information, but we can critique what you are doing. We can say “That’s the wrong way.” So there are many ways to give you the information. Because we have to be in a domestic situation we can defend. It can be like a seminar; you can say you have three possibilities and we can tell you, “That’s wrong; that’s complicated,” etc.

Galley: We tested two different triggers, and both were successful.